

## NE 6001 - Noel Park/Turnpike Lane Environmental Visual Audit

The EVA report has been created using the 7 Attributes of Safer Places – the planning system and crime prevention (2004 Archived).

Safer Places focuses on 7 attributes of sustainability that are particularly relevant to crime prevention. The attributes are general and descriptive, they are not prescriptive or exhaustive. They are not a set of rules to be applied to all situations, but should be considered as prompts to the consideration of crime prevention and promoting community safety, primarily through the planning system.

The document was superseded in 2014 with updated planning practice guidance, however, the attributes still provide a simple yet effective framework for surveying the built environment.

### The 7 Attributes of Safer Places

#### **Access and movement**

Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security.

#### **Structure**

Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.

#### **Surveillance**

Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.

#### **Ownership**

Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community.

#### **Physical protection**

Places that include necessary, well-designed security features.

#### **Activity**

Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times.

#### **Management and maintenance**

Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.

# Summary of Recommendations

An Executive Summary of the main findings is always good practice, followed by detailed observations and recommendations in the main body of the report.

For the purpose of the EVA we are recommending the following target hardening tools which not only aid in the prevention of burglary but also reduce other secondary crimes and ASB related issues at the location

1. *Target hardening* the doors and windows of individual properties, thus reducing the opportunity of burglary offences.
2. *Use of video door bells* – a visual deterrent that puts the eyes of capable guardians on the street, this device may also lead to residents sharing information via social media platforms (closed groups). Therefore, it may also deter ASB, Robbery and MV crime as secondary issues.
3. *Alley gating* – there are two type of alleys within the location
  - a. Street Mews – Access points between shop fronts that lead to properties on the rear ground floor of said shop fronts, effectively leading to a street.
  - b. Alleyway Mews – Access points to the rear of shops that lead to elevated apartments above shop fronts that have been created due to rear extensions of the properties and retail units.

It is important to note that both alleyways give access to the rear of terraced houses thus protection is dual fold for both streets.

4. *Neighbourhood Watch Scheme* - Integral to the success of the target hardening recommendations is the constant engagement and assistance from the NWS scheme and its coordinators who provide local community champions supporting the crime prevention campaign that will promote the legacy of physical target hardening.

## Location One (1)

**House unit numbers** - Bury Road (17), Westbeech Road (104), Whymark Avenue (48) & Westbury Avenue (20) (East of High Road)

**Apartment unit numbers** – Whymark (18) Bellevue court (9) Westbeech (8)

**Total Number of units - 204**

1. Target harden doors and windows of Terraced houses/ Terraced house HMOs and Apartment blocks
  - a. Locks
    - i. Euro cylinder – 70%
    - ii. Deadlock x 2 & Deadlock night latch – 30%
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowling
  - e. Sash window locks
  - f. Security film to glazing
2. Video doorbells on street level (204 units)
3. Replace/ Refurbish rear fencing along Westbeech Road (rear of Whymark Avenue) – 46 metres
4. Replace/ Refurbish rear fencing of Apartments on rear of Westbeech Road (Bury Road) – 40 metres

## Location Two (2) – High Road, Wood Green

1. Gate alleyway between 7&9 High Road - Pedestrian only 1.5 – 2.5 metres wide/ 2.4 metres height including infill and exposed tops, with self-closer and access control (may be analogue due to nature of homes behind)
  - a. Secure the rear of the properties of High Road
  - b. Secures the rear of properties for Waldegrave Road

2. Gate Alleyway leading through Hazel Mews (just off High Road) - Pedestrian, possibly vehicle 2.5 – 3 metres wide/ 2.4 metres in height including, no infill if vehicle access required, exposed tops, self-closer and access controlled
  - a. Secure the rears of properties of High Road
  - b. Secure the rear of properties on Alexandra Road
3. Gate Alleyway leading through Walnut Mews (just off High Road in Colrairie Road) - Wide Pedestrian 2- 3 metres across / 2.4 metres in height including, no infill if vehicle access required, exposed tops, self-closer and access controlled
  - a. Secure the rear of properties of High Road
  - b. Secure the rear of properties on Alexandra Road
4. Target harden doors of High Street side HMOs ( see location one) 5 unit doors ( rest is from the rear)
  - a. Solid core door
  - b. Locks
    - i. Euro cylinder – 70%
    - ii. Deadlock x 2 & Deadlock night latch – 30%
  - c. London/Birmingham bar
  - d. Spy hole
  - e. Mailbox cowling

### **Location Three (3) – Turn Pike Lane (South East of High Road)**

1. Target harden doors of HMOs/ Terraced Houses – 52 units/doors
  - a. Locks
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowling
  - e. Security film to glazing
2. Alley Gate Turnpike Mews Turnpike Lane – Set between 63 & 65 Turnpike Lane – less than 2 metres wide/3 metres high, pedestrian only
3. Turnpike Pike Mews – Target harden doors and windows – only needed if no alley gate
  - i. Locks
  - ii. London/Birmingham bar
  - iii. Spy hole
  - iv. Mailbox cowling
  - v. Secure the perimeters between houses.
4. Alley Gate The Mews – Set between 79 & 81 Turnpike Lane - 2.2 metres wide/3 metres high with infill pedestrian and vehicle gate, self-closing access controlled

### **Location Four (4) - East of High Road - Encompassing Alexandra Road (35), Burghley Road (44), Courcy Road (28), Vernon Road (24), Waldegrave Road (43), Lyttleton Road (14), Brampton Park Road (9), Coleraine Road (40).**

1. Target harden doors and windows of Terraced houses and HMOs - 237 unit/doors
  - a. Locks
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowling
  - e. Security film to glazing
  - f. Sash window locks
2. Video doorbells.
3. Replace/Refurbish alley gating between semi-detached homes

## Consideration for Routine Activity Theory

All recommendations have been made with due consideration to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) in mind with the concept of

**Motivated offenders** – where possible we have reduced the opportunity for the offender to commit an offence, by making it both difficult for them to enter a premises via their normal means and via showing them that the gain is not worth the risk.

**Suitable target** - With the above measures we have reduced the feasibility of the targets suitability, thus reducing the opportunity of crime.

**Absence of a suitable guardian** - With modern living there is little opportunity for a guardian to be present at a property 24/7. With the use of the measures that we have provided, in particular with video doorbells we have introduced the modern suitable guardian, whereby you don't need to be home. You can still monitor your home and engage with anyone at your door, whether lawfully or unlawfully.

## Introduction — Location description, General Observations and Context

The area selected for this Environmental Visual Audit is part of Noel Park Ward, in the London Borough of Haringey. It is an area that is approximately 1.2 Square kilometre, which is half the size of any ward in Haringey and across London. Noel Park is home to approximately 15,000 residents which is a larger population compared to other London Wards. The area chosen within Noel Park is approximately 25-30% of the geographical area of the total ward, but it is considered the main Town Centre of Haringey due to its close proximity to the LBoH council offices, High Street and accessibility via public transport. The area is well known for high street crime and gang related activities within the area, which borders Ducketts Common to the south.

The area boundaries are Turnpike lane leading into Westbury Avenue to the south, Westbeech to the east, Alexandra Road to the west. All side locations meet at the triangular point where Alexandra Road meets the main High Road which runs through the centre.

**Road links** - The main road that runs through the centre has high levels of vehicle traffic and links via road to the A406 (North Circular) to the north and A10 to the east.

**Public Transport** - There is access to local underground stations (Wood Green and Turnpike Lane) and bus services to the main train stations. The High Road has a transport PTAL rating of 6, which is considerably higher than other wards.

One of the earliest garden suburbs in the world, the Noel Park Estate was designed to provide affordable housing for working-class families wishing to leave the inner city; every property had both a front and back garden. It was planned from the outset as a self-contained community close enough to the rail network to allow its residents to commute to work. In line with the principles of the Artisans Company's founder, William Austin, no public houses were built within the estate, and there are still none today.

The entire area has approximately 720 properties of which

- 44 are part of low rise apartments
- 60 are part of Mews alleyways
- 112 units are single units (HMOs or flats divided between 35 houses)
- Remaining 504 are terraced or semi-detached properties

An approximation has been made based on a site survey (conducted in quick time) and due to the adapting of single units to multiple dwellings combined with the non-homogenous nature of the rear alleyways and Mews properties.


The Metropolitan Police strategic insight unit have conducted research based on the past 5 years of burglaries, as of the end of 2020. This area was highlighted as one of the highest rates of acquisitive crime (including burglary) in London.

The following maps show the road names, the burglary map of the area and the area segmented into


specific locations that enable us to provide concise evaluation and recommendations.



Haringey in relation to the rest of London




Noel Park ward in relation to the rest of Haringey



This map shows the proportion of the target area to the overall size of Noel Park ward and the main trunk roads that lead through the ward north to south and east to west.

It is important to note that the north to south route is through the main high street which is subject to a high level of ASB, drinking and drug related issues leading to various crimes including robbery and burglary which often occur off the main high street out of plain sight.

This map shows the exact location indicating the burglary issues over a 5 year period.



**Demographic Social divide** - It is important to understand that there is an East to West social divide within the borough separated by the railway line which is just to left of the border of Noel Park, the target area is part of a regeneration programme known as Haringey Heartlands and encompasses parts of Noel Park (Clarendon Gasworks on the border of the railway line will incorporate 1600 new homes when it is completed in 2028). Whilst this is welcomed in areas regeneration, it must also be noted that new properties may also be a crime generator as it brings more affluence to an area and the development will not include the regeneration or target hardening of current housing stock.

**Permeability** – As previously stated the area is permeable via road, but it is also permeable on foot, in particular there are foot routes that cut through the east side of the area. These routes have different and definitive functions.


- **Alleyways** – Used as short cuts through the housing estate. During the day time these areas would be used regularly as thoroughfares and local residents feel comfortable walking through them. But during the hours of darkness they promote the fear of crime and are narrow and dark with no natural surveillance due to gable end walls and high fencing.





**Arnold Bennett Way** – Links Alexandra Road to Brampton Court and Burghley Road at the north end of the target area

- **Mews Alleyways** - These alleyways lead to the rear of the shops and would have provided access for the original shopkeepers in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, either for storage or for somewhere to live. There are two areas of concern
  - **Alleyways between the building lines** - properties at the rear have evolved due to extensions that include larger commercial footage on the ground floor and apartments above, accessed via cast iron staircases. Access via the alleyways if uncontrolled is often unpleasant and gives easy access to the rear gardens of neighbouring properties. This connectivity makes it an attractive place to live, however it makes it highly permeable, which is a reason behind its high burglary rate.
  - **Alleyways with under crofts** – Similar to between building line but is part of the original building (originally stables), with a habitable area above the under croft. The under crofts are not maintained and can be unpleasant, dark and often where bins are kept. The original design would have led the alleyway to a pleasant Mews street scene with an element of privacy. The properties in these locations are on the ground floor and create a street scene which could be pleasant to live in if controlled



**Turnpike Mews off Turnpike road** – turnpike Mews is slightly different

Turnpike Mews is slightly different as the area has been redeveloped with little thought to the access control to the area. There are at least 2 private developments operated by Linton Mews that are similar on Turnpike Lane and the bottom of the High Road which have private access. At this stage it is not known if there has been any crime at these locations.

- **Street door alleyways** – These entrances are deceptive as they appear to be front doors on the high street elevation, but lead through an alleyway to the rear of the property to metal stairs to the upper floors, we found that these areas often have rear gardens that are not maintained and used for fly tipping etc. by the shopkeepers. Occasionally these entrances are incorporated into the building with access stairways straight from the street to the upper floors and can often be seen as an extra street door to the side of the shops.


The alleyways that lead to the rear of the high streets encourage crime and ASB and make the adjacent houses vulnerable, they can also provide deceptive information on maps on the amount of housing units that occupy the area.

**General Residential Area** – The housing stock in the area was developed at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century to house the working class labour population, to give them a standard of modern living and access to trains into the centre of London. Most of the houses were designed to be small to avoid overcrowding or renting of rooms, this has changed in recent years, as the rear of properties have been developed allowing for multiple occupation.

With this area having been identified as being one of the most vulnerable to burglary in London, research by way of reviewing 5 years of crime reports in the area and attending the area have been conducted to identify particular locations that any security improvements would have the most significant positive impact on. In doing so within this area four localities have been identified.

This map shows the target area broken down into 4 locations, this was required because of the geographic size of the target area which does not lend itself to an EVA.

By segmenting the area into smaller, more homogenous portions we ensure that the recommendations are bespoke to the location types.



**Location One** – Westbeech Road, Bury Road, Whymark Ave & Westbury Avenue – At first glance the area has the appearance of a being locked in, almost a cul-de-sac. But Whymark Avenue leads to an alleyway at the rear of Westbeech (The Sandings) which leads to under Westbury Avenue and into the neighbouring estate giving this area easy egress when crime occurs.



**Location Two – Wood Green High Road (lower end)** – Whilst not the largest populated area due to the commercial retail function of the area, it does have an element of HMOs, above and rear of shop apartments via alleyways. These tend to be private landlords and often not subject to the same rigorous maintenance that social landlords may implement.








**Location Three** – Turnpike Lane is again mainly retail but not as high end as the main high street, mainly concentrating on food markets and news agents. In this location there appears to be a high concentration of HMOs/ multiple flats and entrance alleyways to Mews.

#### Location Four

- Alexandra Road
- Burghley Road
- Vernon Road
- Coleraine Road
- Lyttleton Road
- Courcy Road

Mainly terraced houses with some converted into multiple flats or HMOs



#### Crime Data

On inspecting crime data for these five areas, it is clear that these properties are vulnerable.

**London statistical analysis (based on 10 year analysis)** Based on the latest data available from the Officer of National Statistics (ONS) from Sept 2019, in England the current annual burglary rate is 11.4 per 1000 homes per year and in London this raises to 17.2 per 1000 homes. If this rate continued it would mean that over a 10 year period in London every home would have a 17.2% chance of being burgled, and 11.4% nationally.

**Ward statistical Analysis (based on 2018 data provided by MOPAC)** – Shows that Noel Park is the 8<sup>th</sup> highest ward in the borough out of 20 wards.

**Local LSOA statistical analysis ( based on 6 year analysis)** - Further research into the specific LSOA target location data, the modus operandi of the burglaries shows that residential front access (including via a communal door) are a particular issue.

Below are the percentages of the above burglaries noted.



- Locality One – 70.00% via the front and 30.00% via the rear
- Locality Four - 78.05% via the front and 21.95% via the rear

**Location One – Bury Road**

10 burglaries, of which access via the front was gained on 7 occasions (4 via residential Communal Doors) and via the rear on 3 occasions.

**Location Four - Bounded by Alexandra Road and High Road**

41 burglaries, of which access via the front was gained on 32 occasions (with 1 being Commercial and 7 via residential Communal Doors) and via the rear on 9 occasions.


For the rest of this report for each section there will be an entry for each of the four locations as all four have different designs, features and recommendations.

**See appendices 1-3 for supporting ward data**

# Location One – EVA (South West of High Road)

Note that while the key areas of focus are on Bury road and Westbeech, the observations made in this section of the report are indicative for the whole of Location one, especially around the weaknesses of doors and windows.

## 1. Access and movement - Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security.



Whilst at first inspection the location appears to be reasonably isolated with little or no traffic in the area. It can be seen from the image to the left (green for foot traffic and red for vehicle traffic) that permeability is an issue in terms of easy egress via foot after an offence has been committed and also providing an opportunity to drive past and review the vulnerabilities of the neighbourhood.

It is worth noting that the site inspection showed an

unreasonable number of video door bells at the corner of Bury and Westbeech Road, indicating a concern for issues that may go beyond burglary (red circle).

Particular concern must be made to the access that travels under Westbury Road via the Sandings as this again makes for easy egress after an offence to neighbouring estates making it difficult for capable guardians such as police to follow when an offence has been committed. Important to note that vehicle egress has already been restricted on along Whymark Road, possibly due to earlier issues caused by traffic ASB (orange circle)



**Public Transport** - location 1 is within walking distance of Turnpike Lane underground station, access can be gained to location one via the high road which would be the main thorough fare.

## 2. Structure and Layout - Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.

Primarily the properties are end of 20<sup>th</sup> century terraced houses with no off street parking facilities which were given heritage status due to their typical design features for the period.


The only areas of difference are highlighted in blue, which would have been caused by WW2 bomb damage and the subsequent houses and low rise apartments were not designed to match the surrounding houses.

Each house has a respectable sized garden at the rear, but rear fencing can be exposed to intruders.



### 3. Surveillance (natural, informal and formal) - *Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.*

The properties appear to lend themselves well for overlooking the street, but typically these windows are the within the main living area and would have either a sofa or TV in front of them. The active windows would be located at the back, where the kitchens are, towards the rear gardens with an additional annex on the rear. The image below shows a typical Victorian terraced house and how it would have been laid out originally.



Typical Victorian Layout

Westbeech Road showing similar building type



This layout shows that the properties are more prone to burglary from the front due to the layout of the building.

Note the use of video doorbells in this location, this indicates that the residents are not active at the front of the building, video doorbells give them a level of comfort that the front is being watched but does not encourage active surveillance.

### 4. Ownership - *Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community.*

Within Westbeech and Bury Roads there are still a considerable amount of properties under council ownership and these would be subject to refurbishment/improvement programmes by



the local authority. Often LA's can take a considerable amount of time, due to budget constraints, to maintain their housing stock. Taking this into consideration the majority of houses are well looked after by the residents, many who have lived there a number of years.

The only exception to this is the apartment blocks that appear to be run down and have not received any refurbishments for some time.



Nestbury Road Apartments



Whymark House apartments

### 5. Physical Protection - Places that include necessary, well-designed security features.

The terraced housing in this area is indicative of both Location 1 and 4 showing the main weak points at the front, to the doors and the windows. Within Location one this partly due to the listed status of the buildings and the fact that doors and windows were replaced by the council with similar designs, albeit modern versions but with the same issues

#### Glazed doors with single points of locking



Typical examples of original Victorian doors in Westbeech and Bury road doors with glazed window, night latch ( easily slipped open) and deadlock (which often is not locked and easy to determine lock status)

Attempts have been made to some of the doors to target harden them, but with little thought to the need for complete door enhancements.

LB of Haringey have replaced some of the doors, but due to the existing door being part of the heritage status of the area, the doors had to be of a similar style. Whilst these doors may be accredited to modern standards of PAS24, this would not include attack tested glazing.

A statement confirmed by a local resident who stated that the glazing is broken and the handle/thumb turn for the multipoint locking system is used to open the door.



### Sash Windows

These windows are typical of the area and prone to being easy to break into, with both period and modern pvc windows. Often the locks that come with the windows are left open or don't lock at all.



The original window locks are often painted over, rendering them unusable and unlockable or there are no locks present (demonstrated by accompanying image) which reduces their effectiveness against burglary.

**Apartment doors** – behind the communal doors the residential doors are of poor quality, mainly due to age and design. Albeit there is 2 layers of security, the first security door is not to the same standard that we would apply under current guidelines.



Typical Westbeeche front door with excessive glazing minimal locks



Typical Whymark front door – solid core door with minimal locks

### Fences

Due to the layout and design of the area there are certain locations that have fence treatments along the road, creating a dead rear elevation and often in various states of dis-repair. Attached shows an example of fencing at the rear of Whymark running along the length and to the rear of Westbeeche on Bury road, whilst the MO for burglary is not indicative of this area to access the properties at the rear, it does raise concern that if the front of house is improved will the point of entry be displaced to the rear.



Rear of Westbeech Apartments on Bury road



Rear of Whymark road on Westbeech road

**6. Activity** - *Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times.*

As can be seen from the images at the beginning of this section, this area is transient (only used to get from A2B) especially being so closely linked to the High Street and doesn't experience the level of community focus that enclosed communities may bring.

**7. Management and Maintenance** - *Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.*

Due to the mix tenure of the area, there is no designated management and maintenance other than that provided by the local authority. There is evidence to suggest with the apartment blocks that a severe lack of maintenance has led to the slow degradation of the apartments and their surroundings.

## Location one – Recommendations

**Bury Road, Westbeech Road, Whymark Avenue & Westbury Avenue (East of High Road)**

The crime MO for burglary indicates that the entry to properties is at the front building line via the street door and that the main items that are stolen are small but of high value (phones, laptops, jewellery). Therefore the following recommendations have been **made in order of priority** subject to availability of funding.

1. **Target harden doors and windows of Terraced houses/Terraced house HMOs and Apartment blocks to include where required – Up to 204 doors**
  - a. Locks
    - i. Deadlock x2 & deadlocking night latch (30% for old doors )
    - ii. Euro cylinder ( 70% for new doors )
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowl
  - e. Sash window locks
  - f. Security film to glazing on old and new doors
2. **Video doorbells on street level – Up to 204 homes. It is important to note that a video doorbell has many benefits other than reducing burglary**
  - a. Increase the surveillance via capable guardian at street level
    - i. Reducing secondary crime such as robbery, violence and antisocial behaviour.



- ii. Provides evidence of criminal activity to aid in criminal proceedings
- iii. Rule sets behaviour at the front door (you are being watched)
- 3. Replace/ Refurbish rear fencing of Apartments on Westbeech Road (at rear on Bury Road)
- 4. Replace/ Refurbish rear fencing along Westbeech Road (rear of Whymark Avenue)

**Note** – It has been considered to replace and improve the main entrances of the Apartment Blocks. But after deliberation due to cost factors, it is seen that the best alternative is to improve the front doors that belong to the individual apartments.

All products where possible must be certified and approved to a British standard from an SBD member company. An accredited product proven to face a certain level of attack that is manufactured by a Secure by Design Member Company will ensure the security of the door and in turn ensure the intervention is maintained for a considerable length of time.

### Further Recommendations

It should further be recommend that the target hardening should be combined with further recommendations for “**soft**” target hardening that should change residents attitudes to the possibility of being a victim of crime and raise their awareness of ways to protect themselves from burglary. These should include, but not be exhaustive, the following initiatives.

- 1. Crime prevention campaigns
  - a. Leaflet drops/mailshots
  - b. Direct marketing via social media
- 2. Property marking such as bike marking or select DNA.

### Consideration for Routine Activity Theory

All recommendations have been made with due consideration to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) in mind with the concept of

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
**Suitable target** - With the above measures we have reduced the feasibility of the targets suitability, thus reducing the opportunity of crime.

**Absence of a suitable guardian** - With modern living there is little opportunity for a guardian to be present at a property 24/7. With the use of the measures that we have provided, in particular with video doorbells we have introduced the modern suitable guardian, whereby you don't need to be home. You can still monitor your home and engage with anyone at your door, whether lawfully or unlawfully.

## Location Two – EVA (High Road)

### 1. Access and movement – *Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security.*

The High Road runs directly through the centre of the target location and provides access points via foot and vehicle through to the East, West and South. By its nature it feeds into the very fabric of the residential sections of the focused area. As well as providing access routes to the residential neighbourhoods on the west side there are alleys that provide access to apartments above the shops, as well access on street level to similar apartments. Due to the time sensitive nature of this report it is difficult to fully know the extent of the properties involved, therefore representative examples have been used (as explained in the introduction)



As can be seen from the map, the main thoroughfare by vehicle is along the main high road and along Turnpike Lane (marked in Red).

The red line areas also provide access to the shops and to Flats/HMOs on the High Street

The areas marked in Green are locations that run to the rear to provide access for the apartments above the rear of shops as well, these are not well maintained and it may not be possible to provide individual door enhancements to all of the homes.

**Public Transport** - Location 2 is between Woodgreen to the North and Turnpike Lane to the south. Location 2 is both partly destination and thoroughfare to Turnpike Lane station

### 2. Structure and Layout - *Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.*

**Alleys** - There are several entrances off of the High Road (shown in the above map in green) that lead to back alleys, these in turn lead to apartments at the rear of the shops, and in some scenarios the rear gardens of residential properties. The alleys are poorly kept, unattractive and are used for secondary crime such as drink related ASB and drugs. The alleys of concern are as follows.

#### Between 7&9 High Road




Front entrance alley off of the high street

Front entrance alley off of the high street leads to approximately 20 rear gardens of

neighbouring properties and possibly another 20-30 “loft style” apartments above the shops



### Hazel Mews (just off High Road)



Located at the top end of the area, just off the High Street.

### Walnut Mews (just off High Road in Colrairie Road)

Located in the middle, just off the of the High Street



### HMOs/Multiple Flat conversions

There are several entrance doors on the High Street that lead to flat conversions above the shops, organically they would alternate with the properties that are accessed from the rear.



As can be seen from the images above, all of the doors lead directly into the high /street with no defensible space. Often it is easy to gain access via slipping the night latch, as these doors do not lead directly into the main address of each individual unit. Protecting these doors will also give protection to mail and cycles left in the corridors behind this door.

### 3. Surveillance (natural, informal and formal) - Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.

There is surveillance along the High Street, both formal (shopkeepers and residents) and informal (LBoH CCTV), but due to the transient nature of the High Street it is often not of



practical use and its sole purpose is not to overlook the doors.

For the purpose of this report the CCTV does not cover sufficiently the locations of concern, as they tend to focus on robbery locations within the high Street and drink/drug related ASB.

Due to the location and organic nature of the rear upper tier homes, there is very little opportunity for surveillance amongst neighbours. At best they would only see one or two neighbours, where by a traditional street scene (as in Location 1 and 4) would observe approximately 4-5 opposite a street door and possibly 2 either side, giving a greater coverage.



Typical example of raised apartments and the area of observation



Typical example of a residential street nearby that gives better observation over neighbour's properties

It is also important to note that the lower part of the building at the rear is for the shop usage and these typically would only be used once, maybe twice per day for refuse (not at all if there is no vehicle access) or as a fire exit.

#### **4. Ownership** - *Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community*

There is only ownership of individual properties in this location and this may not be owner/occupier. The owners maybe private landlords and who are not interested in maintenance of a property, above and beyond what is legally required. This lack of ownership transfers to the resident who through no fault of their own may not have the funds, ability or permission to take ownership of the property or their surrounding area.

#### **5. Physical Protection** - *Places that include necessary, well-designed security features.*

Upon site inspection it was shown that the properties in the alleyways have very little to protect their homes and ill-fitting/not fit for purpose retrofits are utilised.



**Hazel Mew's example** – gated entrance to several apartments. If the gate was set an angle following the yellow line then the corner of ASB would have been avoided, now the residents have to pass the location and see this or pass the perpetrators and experience the issues first hand.


**Gate to the alley way off of the high Street** – Google images shows that the gate has been left in the open position since 2008, is was installed but never been implemented, rendering it “unfit for purpose” in providing a meaningful entrance for the residents. Even if the gate was not closed and locked but allowed to swing into the closed position it would indicate to passers-by that this was private space and would reduce the negative activity.




**6. Activity** - Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times.

Drink, drugs, ASB as well as fly-tipping are of a major concern, giving the impression that the area is not cared for or that no one lives at the location. It sets in process a spiral of decay, whereby it becomes difficult to repair or rebuild an area without outside intervention from local authority. Whilst our main focus of this report is preventing burglary, the secondary crime reduction benefits cannot be ignored. Below are examples from all of the locations specified.


**7. Management and Maintenance** - Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.




Local residents and shopkeepers have attempted to target harden their properties, often with unsightly measures



Corner used for drinking and sexual activity (condom on the floor)



Flytipping deeper into the alleyway



Arson – not known whether accidental or deliberate, but who has responsibility for cleaning it.



There is little to offer for this section as it is not known who would have responsibility for the alleyways and their maintenance. Part of the issue is the level of multi-tenancy between commercial and private landlords that occupy the area.



**What Works** - It is important to note that there are developments within Turnpike Lane and the High Road that offer a similar arrangement, but they are managed by a private company (Linton Apartments) with automated audio visual access control to Alleys or Mews and provide a pleasant off street home experience.



This shows the quality of the apartments that can be developed in a small space and the location shown in the map, which is less than 300 metres from a tube station. This development was completed around 2015



## Location Two – Recommendations

The following recommendations should improve the security of the homes within these areas. Our focus isn't on the street doors at this location due to the multi-tenancy that exists at the locations. Alley gating brings other benefits in reducing secondary crime in the areas.

### Location Two (2) – High Road, Wood Green

1. Gate pedestrian alleyway between 7&9 High Road -
  - a. Pedestrian gate only
    - i. 1.5 – 2.5 metres wide and 2.4 metres height
    - ii. Including infill to increase height or exposed tops.
    - iii. Self-closing with access control – Pin code with thumb/ handle on the internal side both sides to cater for multi-tenancy

This target hardening measure will secure the rear of the properties of the High Road and the rear of properties for Waldegrave Road as well as the properties that reside at the location

2. Gate pedestrian/ vehicle alleyway leading through Hazel Mews on Alexandra Road (just off High Road) -
  - a. Pedestrian Gate - Giving limited vehicle access
  - b. 2.5 – 3 metres wide/ 2.4 metres in height
  - c. No infill if vehicle access is required
  - d. Exposed tops



e. Self-closing with access control – Pin code required due to multi-tenancy arrangement  
This target hardening measure will secure the rear of properties on the High Road and the rear of properties on Alexandra Road, as well as the properties that reside at this location.

3. Gate Alleyway leading through Walnut Mews (just off High Road in Colrairie Road) -

- a. Vehicle gate or wide Pedestrian access
- b. 2- 3 metres across / 2.4 metres in height
- c. No infill panel if vehicle access required, exposed tops.
- d. Self-closer and access controlled

This target hardening measure will secure the rear of properties on the High Road and the rear of properties on Waldegrave Road

4. Target harden doors of High Street side HMOs (see location one) 5 unit doors (rest is from the rear as per recommendation 1 to 3)

- a. Solid Core door
- b. Locks
  - i. Deadlocks x2 and deadlock night latch - 100%
- c. London/Birmingham bar
- d. Spy hole
- e. Mailbox cowling
- f. Security film to glazing
- g. Video doorbell that allows multiple users - It is important to note that a video doorbell has many benefits other than reducing burglary
  - i. Increase the surveillance via capable guardian at street level
    - 1. Reducing secondary crime such as robbery, violence and antisocial behaviour.
    - 2. Provides evidence of criminal activity to aid in criminal proceedings
    - 3. Rule sets behaviour at the front door (you are being watched)

All products where possible must be certified and approved to a British standard from an SBD member company. An accredited product proven to face a certain level of attack that is manufactured by a Secure by Design Member Company will ensure the security of the door and in turn ensure the intervention is maintained for a considerable length of time.

### Further Recommendations

It should further be recommend that the target hardening should be combined with further recommendations for “**soft**” ( **but no less important** ) target hardening that should change residents attitudes to the possibility of being a victim of crime and raise their awareness of ways to protect themselves from burglary. These should include, but not be exhaustive, the following initiatives.

- 1. Crime prevention campaigns
  - i. Leaflet drops/mailshots
  - ii. Direct marketing via social media
- 2. Property marking such as bike marking or select DNA.
- 3. Involvement with local residents associations and ward panels

### Consideration for Routine Activity Theory

All recommendations have been made with due consideration to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) in mind with the concept of


**Motivated offenders** – where possible we have reduced the opportunity for the offender to commit an offence, by making it both difficult for them to enter a premises via their normal means and via showing them that the gain is not worth the risk.

**Suitable target** - With the above measures we have reduced the feasibility of the targets suitability, thus reducing the opportunity of crime.

**Absence of a suitable guardian** - With modern living there is little opportunity for a guardian to be present at a property 24/7. With the use of the measures that we have provided, in particular with video doorbells we have introduced the modern suitable guardian, whereby you don't need to be home. You can still monitor your home and engage with anyone at your door, whether lawfully or unlawfully.

# Location Three - EVA

**Access and movement** - *Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security.*



Location three focuses on Turnpike lane which is situated at the bottom of the target area. The main road provides access to the north into location 4. It also leads to Mew's roads off of the main road (marked in yellow), dead ends that lead only to the back of the street properties, but gives access to the rear of properties on Sidney road.


The roads marked in red provide one way and two way vehicle access through the east side of the estate.

**Public Transport** - Location 3 is to the west of Turnpike lane station and would also form the thorough fare to access the tube station. Location 3 (Turnpike Lane is both destination and thoroughfare)

## **1. Structure and Layout** - *Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.*


Turnpike lane is a complicated street layout because it has a combination of different types of dwellings in a short distance along the main street. Including small retail units (with apartments), terraced houses and ground floor Mews properties with under croft alley access from the main road. The Mews locations in particular are of concern as their design (which probably dates back to the original buildings being created) lend themselves to drink/drug related ASB and promotes the fear of crime when heading towards your home.

The crime that occurs in the Mews alleys often goes unreported and becomes the “norm”. Issues such as urination, sexual activity and drugs taking can easily be hidden from the main street. This type of activity leads to opportunistic crime such as burglary as the perpetrator will already have been in the location when it was unoccupied and quiet, whilst committing the minor offences.



Lack of building control on Turnpike Lane has allowed the street scene to become untidy and poorly laid out, allowing it to suffer low level ASB such as littering, double parking etc.

The image below also shows stealth planning for Turnpike Mews when it was developed, effectively shutting the access off to the Mews



## 2. Surveillance (natural, informal and formal) - Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.

### General

As can be seen above the street scene does not lend itself to surveillance due its organic nature and multiple activities, it is difficult to determine who belongs in the area.

### HMOs/Multiple Flat conversions

These have no surveillance as the burglaries happen behind closed doors once off the main street and due to the transient nature associated with such properties. As reported previously often the owners are private landlords and may not be interested in maintenance of a property, above and beyond what is legally required. This lack of ownership transfers to the resident who through no fault of their own may not have the funds, ability or permission to take ownership of the property of their surrounding area.



## Mews

There is no CCTV inside the alleys and due to the shape and size it is difficult for residents to see into the alley while they are in their home address. A key part of surveillance is natural and obscured vision to the target area, this cannot be achieved with both Mews areas as one is in the shape of a **T** and the other turns right into a street scene **L** shape. The only time a potential offender could be seen is when they have already entered the semi-private space.



This image shows the locations of concern, surveillance is difficult behind closed doors, in particular for the HMOs

### 3. Ownership - Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community.

As reported previously often the owners are private landlords and may not be interested in maintenance of a property, above and beyond what is legally required. This lack of ownership transfers to the resident who through no fault of their own may not have the funds, ability or permission to make take ownership of the property of their surrounding area.

## Turnpike Mews

Appears to be little ownership by the residents. Whilst it is tidy, it is not well maintained. Some



of this may be due to the lack of sunlight (moss on the pavement). But it does have the appearance that nobody ventures outside, this could be due to several doors having key safes and which often indicates that the residents may need carers and are unable to go outside or do not feel safe to do so.

### 4. Physical Protection - Places that include necessary, well-designed security features.

**HMOs** – the doors used on the HMOs are of poor quality and may have been used at the individual location for many years with no enhancements based on today's principles. They certainly would not be an accredited product at the time of installation. Enhancing the doors at street level would be of greater benefit than individual doors to apartments/rooms as it would also protect property inside the hallways, such as mail and cycles and would give a greater

sense of security when entering the first threshold.

**Mews** - The doors in Turnpike Mews are all of the same brand and the Mews they vary in type and quality from new (possibly accredited) to original doors. It was considered that the best option was to gate the Mews as the best value for money and least inconvenience to the residents that live in the location.

There are residents in the entrance road of Turnpike Mews that have concern for their property as some of the entrances have the metal gates over the doors. The alley leading to The Mews is in a similar condition



Shutters over the rear shop entrances, metal gates over doors all indicators that there has been crime in the location

**Terraced Houses** – There are a limited number of terraced houses on the main road and their main point of entry is through the front door, this would be our main consideration on the terraced houses still remaining long the main street.

**5. Activity** - *Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times.*

**Main road** – Is an active street, transient and whilst there is plenty of activity it is not necessarily positive.

**Turnpike Mews**

There appears to be little activity in this courtyard. The deeper entrance to the door and the key security box in the doorway of several units indicate that these residential homes are meant to be mobility compliant or have evolved to be utilised in such a way due their ground floor locality. This in turn will reduce the activity in the courtyard as the residents may be too vulnerable or incapable of leaving their homes, especially at night time.

**The Mews**



Although only a 50 metres away from Turnpike Mews (originally part of the same street) the Mews is more open and does not have the same residential atmosphere. Doorways have no recesses, residents can park outside their front doors and in some cases they have taken ownership of the space in front of their homes. It appears that Turnpike Mews and the Mews were one and the same and TM experienced an infill build which may have been detrimental to the original design and concept of the street scene, given current planning and designing out crime guidelines, gating would have been requested. It is worth noting that both entrances have similar secondary issues with ASB, sexual activity and drug taking.

**6. Management and Maintenance** - *Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.*

As can be seen in the examples above there is little can be seen of management and

maintenance of in this location. Turnpike Mews in particular has seen little maintenance to the area. The only management or maintenance is down to individual responsibility rather than a coordinated approach to the area.

## Location Three– Recommendations

### Location Three (3) – Turn Pike Lane (South East of High Road)

1. **Target harden doors of HMOs/ Terraced Houses – 52 units/doors**
  - a. Locks
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowling
  - e. Security film to glazing
2. **Alley Gate Turnpike Mews, Turnpike Lane – Set between 63 & 65 Turnpike Lane**
  - a. Pedestrian access only
  - b. Self closing and pin code access
  - c. Less than 2 metres wide/ 3 metres high.

**Secondary offence mitigation** - As well mitigating against burglary the use of the alley gate will also aid in the prevention of secondary offences such as drug related ASB, sexual offences, robbery and in some cases violence. The gate will help protect the residents and create a more active street scene preventing likely offenders from hiding out of plain sight thus increasing natural surveillance on the street.

3. **Turnpike Pike Mews – Target harden doors and windows**
  - i. Locks
    1. Deadlock x 2 plus guards
    2. Deadlocking night latch x1
  - ii. London/Birmingham bar
  - iii. Spy hole
  - iv. Mailbox cowling
4. **Alley Gate The Mews – Set between 79 & 81 Turnpike Lane -**
  - a. Pedestrian access only
  - b. Self closing and pin code access
  - c. Less than 2 metres wide/ 3 metres high.

**Secondary offence mitigation** - As well mitigating against burglary the use of the alley gate will also aid in the prevention of secondary offences such as drug related ASB, sexual offences, robbery, motor vehicle crime and in some cases violence. The gate will help protect the residents and create a more active street scene preventing likely offenders from hiding out of plain sight thus increasing natural surveillance on the street.

All products where possible must be certified and approved to a British Standard from an SBD member company. An accredited product proven to face a certain level of attack that is manufactured by a Secured by Design Member Company will ensure the security of the door and in turn ensure the intervention is maintained for a considerable length of time.

### Further Recommendations

It should further be recommend that the target hardening should be combined with further recommendations for “soft” target hardening that should change residents attitudes to the possibility of being a victim of crime and raise their awareness of ways to protect themselves from burglary.

These should include, but not be exhaustive, the following initiatives.

- a. Crime prevention campaigns
  - i. Leaflet drops/mailshots
  - ii. Direct marketing via social media
- b. Property marking such as bike marking or select DNA.



- c. Local residents associations
- d. Local Ward panel meetings

### Consideration for Routine Activity Theory

All recommendations have been made with due consideration to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) in mind with the concept of

**Motivated offenders** – where possible we have reduced the opportunity for the offender to commit an offence, by making it both difficult for them to enter a premises via their normal means and via showing them that the gain is not worth the risk.

**Suitable target** - With the above measures we have reduced the feasibility of the targets suitability, thus reducing the opportunity of crime.

**Absence of a suitable guardian** - With modern living there is little opportunity for a guardian to be present at a property 24/7. With the use of the measures that we have provided, in particular with video doorbells we have introduced the modern suitable guardian, whereby you don't need to be home. You can still monitor your home and engage with anyone at your door, whether lawfully or unlawfully.

## Location Four – EVA (West of High Road)

This location focuses on terraced housing and the inherent weakness at the front of the building as per Location one.


1. **Access and movement** - *Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security.*



Whilst at first inspection the location appears to be similar to Location One, but it can be seen by the image shown that there is a level of foot and road permeability that did not exist in the other location. The arrows on the far left show that the access to neighbouring roads and in particular to and from the high street creates a multitude of opportunities for crime including the ability to drive past and review the vulnerabilities of the neighbourhood.

The access from the high street feeds into the local surroundings on foot and does not exclude the criminal on illegal substances that is stealing to feed that habit. The modus operandi of breaking in through the front door by breaking glass or bypassing the night latch is typical of the opportunistic nature of a criminal that has an addictive personality, compared to a career criminal that would not want to be seen or heard. The majority of the property was small items, phones to laptops which could have been easily concealed whilst making off.

Consideration must also be given to Arnold Bennett way, in particular concern must be made to the access that travels between Alexandra road and Burghley road as it provides easy access and egress after an offence has been committed. This makes it difficult for capable guardians such as the police to follow when an offence has occurred. Important to note that vehicle egress has already been restricted on Burghley road, note the amount of the bollards, possibly to disrupt loitering or stop parking.



**Public Transport** - Location 4 is to the north of Turnpike lane station and would also form the main thoroughfare to access the tube station. Access can be gained from Woodgreen station but Turnpike Lane would be the closest for walking ( less than 1 mile)

## **2. Structure and Layout** - *Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict.*

Primarily the properties are end of 20<sup>th</sup> century terraced houses with no off-street parking facilities which were given heritage status due to their typical design features for the period.

There are no apparent areas of bomb damage, therefore the residential area remains unscathed with no areas of major building differences. What is important to note is the layout of the houses, their orientation in relation to each other and the fact that gardens are locked in (especially mid terrace houses), making it difficult to get to the rear of properties. This explains the MO at the location of entering via the front doors and stealing small items (to avoid attention, whilst carrying the stolen items)


Each house has a respectable sized garden at the rear, but side fencing at end of terrace can be exposed to intruders.



### 3. Surveillance (natural, informal and formal) - Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked.

The properties appear to lend themselves well for overlooking onto the street, but typically these windows are the main living area and would have either a sofa or TV in front of it. The active windows would be located at the back (kitchens) towards the rear gardens with an additional annex on the rear. The image below shows a typical Victorian terraced house and how it would have been laid out originally.

This layout shows that the properties are more prone to burglary from the front due to the layout of the building.



Typical Victorian house

House on Vernon Road



**Note** - Compared to Westbeech road, there are little or no video doorbells in this location, indicating that either the residents cannot afford them or they are not aware of the positive outcomes they would bring to the area. Video doorbells bring a level of comfort that the front is being watched but does not encourage active surveillance only passive.

### 4. Ownership - Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community.

It is not known at this stage how many properties are under council or local housing association ownership. At first glance the area appears to be well maintained by local residents, but there are homes that have been neglected at the front, this may be down to individual lack of responsibility or as noted previously, private landlords (HMOs) that do not give the resident the opportunity to engage in ownership activities in the places where they live.

### 5. Physical Protection - Places that include necessary, well-designed security features.





The terraced housing in this area is indicative of both Location 1 and 4, showing the main weak points to the front doors and windows. This is partly due to the listed status of the buildings, there is no evidence to suggest that the doors have been replaced as per Location one, by the local authority.

#### **Glazed doors with single points of locking**

Typical examples of various doors at the location with glazed windows, night latch (easily slipped open) and deadlock (which often is not locked and easy to determine lock status)

Attempts have been made on some of the doors to refurbish, but with little thought to the need for complete door enhancements. Often residents are hesitant on given up the glazing as it provides so much light into the property or may be an attractive leaded window design.



#### **Fences/Gates**

Due to the layout and design of the area there are certain locations that have fence treatments between the houses, creating a point of access in between the houses. Whilst this is not the normal MO of the area, it is a vulnerability that needs to be taken into consideration.

- 6. Activity** - Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times.

As can be seen from the images in the report, this area is residential and pedestrian transient (only used to get from A2B) especially being so closely linked to the High Street and doesn't experience the level of community focus that enclosed communities may experience. Whilst there are capable guardians they may not be about at peak times when the offences occur.

Often it is easy to determine if occupants are in the home address, leaflet dropping, surveys etc. are a confirmed method of discovering if someone is at home or

## **7. Management and Maintenance** - *Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.*

Due to the mix tenure of the area, there is no designated management and maintenance other than that provided by the local authority. There is evidence to suggest with the apartment blocks that a severe lack of maintenance has led to the slow degradation of the apartments and their surroundings.

## **Location Four– Recommendations**

The crime MO for burglary indicates that the entry to properties is at the front building line via the street door and that the main items that are stolen are small but of high value (phones, laptops, jewellery). Therefore the following recommendations have been **made in order of priority** subject to availability of funding.

1. **Target harden doors and windows of Terraced houses/Terraced house HMOs and Apartment blocks to include where required – Up to 204 doors**
  - a. Locks
    - i. Deadlock x2 & deadlocking night latch (30% for old doors )
    - ii. Euro cylinder ( 70% for new doors )
  - b. London/Birmingham bar
  - c. Spy hole
  - d. Mailbox cowling
  - e. Sash window locks
  - f. Security film to glazing on old and new doors
2. **Video doorbells on street level – Up to 204 homes. It is important to note that a video doorbell has many benefits other than reducing burglary**
  - a. Increase the surveillance via capable guardian at street level
    - i. Reducing secondary crime such as robbery, violence and antisocial behaviour.
    - ii. Provides evidence of criminal activity to aid in criminal proceedings
    - iii. Rule sets behaviour at the front door (you are being watched)

All products where possible must be certified and approved to a British standard from an SBD member company. An accredited product proven to face a certain level of attack that is manufactured by a Secure by Design Member Company will ensure the security of the door and in turn ensure the intervention is maintained for a considerable length of time.

### **Consideration for Routine Activity Theory**

All recommendations have been made with due consideration to the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) in mind with the concept of

**Motivated offenders** – where possible we have reduced the opportunity for the offender to commit an offence, by making it both difficult for them to enter a premise via their normal means and via showing them that the gain is not worth the risk.

**Suitable target** - With the above measures we have reduced the feasibility of the target's suitability, thus reducing the opportunity of crime.

**Absence of a suitable guardian** - With modern living there is little opportunity for a guardian to be present at a property 24/7. With the use of the measures that we have provided, in particular with video doorbells we have introduced the modern suitable guardian, whereby you don't need to be home. You can still monitor your home and engage with anyone at your door, whether lawfully or unlawfully.

## Additional Recommendations

1. Property Marking – Select DNA
2. Crime prevention awareness campaign
3. Safer Tottenham BCRP to be extended to Turnpike Lane - <https://www.haringey.gov.uk/news/new-scheme-help-businesses-against-crime>
4. Community Engagement via
  - a. Local Authority
  - b. Local Safer Neighbourhood Team
  - c. Local Ward panel
  - d. Residents Associations
5. Neighbourhood Watch Scheme - Integral to the success of the target hardening recommendations is the constant engagement and assistance from the NWS scheme and its coordinators who provide local community champions supporting the crime prevention campaign that will promote the legacy of physical target hardening.


**Note** – During the time that the interventions are being implemented, it is highly likely that the negative activity will cease to take place in the target area. Combined with the raised awareness, the pay-off for the enhancements should last for many years to come.

**Video doorbells** – Not only do they make people feel safe at home, they may also provide some comfort and personal safety to the pedestrian on the street. Whilst this isn't proven at this time, with the correct signage showing perpetrators that they are being watched, this could prove to be an effective tool in keeping members of the public “feeling” safe to enjoy the residential high street without injury or harassment.




# Appendices 1 — Primary & Secondary crimes per Ward in Haringey 2018


(<https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/london-landscape>)




Burglary offences 2018 (8<sup>th</sup> highest ward)




Robbery Offences (3<sup>rd</sup> Highest Ward)




Female victims of Robbery (Highest Ward)




Drug Offences (2<sup>nd</sup> highest Ward)



Theft of Motor vehicle offences (6<sup>th</sup> Highest Ward)





Criminal Damage to Dwelling offences (4<sup>th</sup> HW)



Criminal Damage (3<sup>rd</sup> Highest Ward)

## Appendices 2 - Typical Offences for Noel Park,

This is shown as a representative of the type of behaviour on the ward and in the target location



## Appendices 3 - LSOA data indicating the scope of the crime and the required benchmark

Adjusted Average (5% tolerance)						
LSOA Code	Borough	Burglary	Bench - 7.91	Robbery	Bench - 1.16	Theft
E01002010	Haringey	20.74238	In Scope	2.39859	In Scope	2.747513516
E01001996	Haringey	13.7013	In Scope	23.33778	In Scope	45.35588132
E01002002	Haringey	20.87929	In Scope	35.67369	In Scope	42.08954016
E01002031	Haringey	12.1274	In Scope	13.87276	In Scope	31.46704168
E01002069	Haringey	16.78804	In Scope	31.13329	In Scope	20.41878135
E01001994	Haringey	21.79852	In Scope	2.282196	In Scope	0.905080627
3 year average						
LSOA Code	Borough	Burglary	Robbery	Theft	Vehicle Offences	Neighbourhood Crime
E01002010	Haringey	34.7	4.0	4.7	28.3	71.7
E01001996	Haringey	13.3	3.3	3.0	19.3	39.0
E01002002	Haringey	40.3	69.0	81.3	29.3	220.0
E01002031	Haringey	28.0	32.0	72.7	37.7	170.3
E01002069	Haringey	39.0	72.7	48.3	49.7	209.7
E01001994	Haringey	39.0	4.0	1.7	20.7	65.3